Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) have proposed that underwriters of seasoned equity offers certify issuer value. The study tests predictions resulting from these papers and finds little evidence from UK rights issues and open offers that underwriting banks certify. The main purpose of underwriting appears to be simply to guarantee the proceeds. There is a positive reaction to open offers (a type of private placing) but this is unlikely to be due to underwriter certification. There is a large loss of value for companies announcing deeply discounted offers, which is attributed to release of bad news on announcement.
INTRODUCTION
One of the decisions companies take when making a seasoned equity offer (SEO) is the type of offer to use, including how much of the offer, if any, should be underwritten. It has been suggested that a major benefit of underwriting is that the underwriting bank certifies the value of the issuing company, and the purpose of this paper is to examine whether this is so in UK rights issues and open offers. In particular, the paper tests predictions arising from the theory of issue method developed by Eckbo and Masulis (EM, 1992) and from the view of underwriter certification proposed by Slovin, Sushka and Lai (SSL, 2000) .
The EM theory extends the model of Myers and Majluf (1984) , which predicts a negative reaction to the announcement of SEOs because the decision to issue implies that the issuer is more likely to be overvalued than undervalued, if the shares are sold to new investors. The feature added by EM is that underwriting by the arranger is assumed to provide imperfect certification that the issuer is not overvalued, which enables the issuer to sell shares at a higher price. The value of this certification benefit is negatively related to the proportion of the issue expected to be taken up by existing shareholders, so a higher take-up implies a lower probability that the issue will be underwritten. The predictions regarding market reaction depend on how reliable certification is assumed to be. EM assume that certification is sufficiently unreliable that the positive effect of underwriting on market price is less than the negative effect of low take-up in underwritten offers.
SSL's study of SEOs in the UK endorses the idea that underwriters certify value, but argues that certification is more reliable than EM assume, and can result in an increase in issuer value. SSL find that the reaction to non-underwritten rights issues is more negative than to underwritten rights issues, and that the reaction to bought deals is positive. Their interpretation is that the reliability of underwriter certification depends on the type of offer and risk to the underwriter, with bought deals carrying reliable certification and nonunderwritten rights zero certification.
The current paper uses data from UK rights issues and open offers, the most common methods of issue in the 1990s. An open offer is a private placing with pre-emption rights preserved. Shares in the open offer are placed by verbal agreement with new investors before the offer is announced, but existing shareholders retain the right to subscribe in proportion to their current holdings. The EM theory predicts that the proportion of an issue underwritten is negatively related to the take-up by existing shareholders, but we do not find this using proxies for expected take-up. Rather, issues are normally fully underwritten except to the extent that legally binding commitments have been given in advance of the public announcement to buy some or all of the shares. Although non-underwritten offers have relatively deep discounts, companies very rarely use a deep discount on its own as a substitute for underwriting. The shares in most non-underwritten offers are mainly or entirely precommitted. This is consistent with the view of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC, 1999) that UK companies are very concerned with certainty of the proceeds in an SEO. The EM theory further predicts that abnormal returns on announcement are negatively related to the proportion underwritten, and that they are positively related to take-up by existing shareholders. But abnormal returns are not related either to the proportion underwritten or to proxies for take-up.
SSL suggest that the reliability of underwriter certification depends on the financial risk borne by the underwriter. The arranging bank bears little risk if it underwrites either a rights issue or an open offer, so the SSL view predicts that the market reaction to both types of offer is similar. Since the take-up by existing shareholders is almost certainly lower in open offers than in rights issues, the EM theory likewise predicts a similar, or more negative, response to open offers. However, we find that the average abnormal return on announcement of offers 50% or more underwritten is -2.6% for rights issues and 2.9% for open offers. The difference in reaction emerges both in the full sample and in a much smaller sample with no major news in the prospectus other than the offer itself. The lack of event study evidence that underwriting banks certify, together with the finding that underwriting is a substitute for precommitment, imply that the primary benefit of underwriting is to guarantee the proceeds, and that the explanation for the positive reaction to open offers should be sought elsewhere than in underwriter certification. In both open offers and private placings, blocks of shares are sold to investors through private negotiation before announcement. Other studies have reported a positive reaction to private placings, and the reasons they advance provide possible explanations for the positive reaction we find to open offers. These reasons include certification of issuer value by placees (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) , improved monitoring by the new investors (Wruck, 1989) , and know-how from the new investors and increased probability of the issuer being taken over (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2000) .
A further result from the event study is that a deeper discount is associated with a more negative abnormal return, as SSL also find. Their interpretation is that a deep discount is a substitute for underwriting in a non-underwritten issue, with no certification, and that in an underwritten issue it signals that the value certified is below the prevailing market price.
We offer a different explanation. Four fifths of the issuers choosing a deep discount (30% to the market price or deeper) are in difficulty, and the reaction on announcement for the minority of healthy companies is close to zero. We infer that the loss in value associated with deep discounts is primarily explained by bad news released on announcement or during the offer, and that offer prices are adjusted downwards by companies which anticipate a fall in share price. Whilst deep discounts are associated with overvalued issuers, the cause of the price fall on announcement is not the deep discount itself.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the arguments of EM and SSL, sets out the predictions to be tested, and reviews existing evidence. Section 3 describes selling and underwriting arrangements in UK rights issues and open offers, and tests whether the proportion underwritten is related to the proportion taken up by existing shareholders.
Section 4 presents the event study evidence and Section 5 concludes.
UNDERWRITER CERTIFICATION (i) The Eckbo-Masulis Theory
The EM theory builds on the model of Myers and Majluf (1984) , in which it is assumed that managers are better informed about the company's value than outsiders, and that they maximise the intrinsic (full information) value of the existing shares. If the new shares are all sold to new investors, and the managers know the company is overvalued, they will always issue. But they will not issue if the company is sufficiently undervalued that the loss to existing shareholders arising from selling new shares at below their intrinsic value exceeds the existing holders' share of the gain from the 'project' to be financed by the proceeds. A decision to issue therefore signals that the highest estimates of the intrinsic value of the company are ruled out, and implies that the company is more likely than not to be overvalued at the market price before the announcement. So the market price is predicted to fall on announcement. The net benefit of issue is [P′/(P′ + E)](E + a + b) -a, where a is the intrinsic value of assets in place, b is the NPV of an investment opportunity for which new equity is required (b ≥ 0), P′ is the market value of the existing shares after announcement of the issue, and E is the proceeds raised from new investors. [P′/(P′ + E)](E + a + b) is the intrinsic value of the existing shareholders' equity if the company issues and invests; a is the intrinsic value of their equity if there is no issue and the investment opportunity is not taken (so b = 0).
EM write the net benefit of issue as b -(c + f), where c is the cost or benefit arising from selling shares to new investors at below or above their intrinsic value, and f is the direct costs of issue. The intrinsic value of the existing equity is a + b, ignoring all costs of issue and therefore assuming that the investment opportunity is taken. With information asymmetry, P′ may be higher or lower than a + b, and
It can be seen that c is positive (a cost) if P′ < a + b. E varies with a number of factors, but EM focus on the proportion of the new shares bought by existing holders, k, which they assume is given exogenously. If k = 1, E = 0 and so c = 0. The company will always issue so long as b > f, even if it is very undervalued, so the predicted change in share price is zero or slightly positive when the issue is announced (slightly positive if there was uncertainty before the issue announcement about whether b exceeded f). If k < 1, some funds are raised from new investors, so the share price is expected to fall on announcement of the issue, and c could be non-zero because E > 0. Other things equal, as k diminishes, E increases, and both the loss in market value on announcement and c increase (lower P′ entails higher c). Myers and Majluf (p. 206) report the results of numerical experiments which show how the loss in market value varies with the proportion of a project financed by cash in hand, which has the same effect as varying k.
EM assume that underwriting provides imperfect certification to investors that the issuer is not overvalued. Although a non-underwritten issue still requires the services of an intermediary, the assumption is that certification of value by the intermediary is more reliable if it has underwritten the issue. Underwriting therefore results in a higher P′ than would result from a non-underwritten issue, so underwriting reduces c. The company opts for underwriting, given its knowledge of k, if b -(c + f) is both positive and larger than b -(c + f)
for a non-underwritten offer. If k = 1, both undervalued and overvalued companies will issue
(if b > f) and will choose a non-underwritten offer, because c is zero and non-underwritten offers have the lowest direct costs. If k = 0, companies which issue will choose an underwritten offer because the benefit from a smaller c is assumed to exceed the extra cost of underwriting (a higher f). Some undervalued companies with k = 0 will choose not to issue, whereas overvalued companies will always issue, unless the underwriter refuses to certify that the company is not overvalued. In this case, the company either issues at a lower underwritten price, or does not issue. For any company there is some value k*, where 1 > k* ≥ 0, below which underwriting becomes worthwhile, if it issues at all. Whilst underwritten issues will be more expensive than non-underwritten issues in terms of direct costs, the net benefit [= b -(c + f)] of an underwritten issue will be greater than if it were not underwritten, given k. Because underwriter certification of value is imperfect, the negative relation between abnormal return on announcement and k is expected to be preserved. Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997, p. 233) note the possibility that screening by underwriters may prevent so many overvalued companies from issuing that there is a positive reaction to underwritten offers. This possibility is not made explicit in EM (1992). Both they and Bøhren et al. clearly regard the theory as predicting a more negative reaction to underwritten offers (EM, 1992, pp. 314 and 325; Bøhren et al., 1997, pp. 229 and 249) .
The theory as outlined so far is a theory of the circumstances in which issuers pay for underwriting. It does not explain why companies might prefer a firm commitment to an underwritten rights issue nor, more generally, how companies choose between different types of underwritten offer. EM make no distinction between types of underwritten offer in terms of the reliability of certification. They state that there are 'additional issuer-borne rights distribution costs' implied by the underwritten rights method (p. 312), and that below a certain value of k it becomes cheaper to opt for a firm commitment. We test the following three predictions resulting from the EM theory.
P1.
The proportion underwritten is negatively related to k, the proportion of shares expected to be sold to existing shareholders. This follows because the benefit of underwriting is to increase P′. A lower k implies a higher E, which implies a lower P′ in the absence of underwriting. It also means there is a higher proportion of nonsubscribers, and it is they who benefit from a higher P'. Since there are proportions underwritten between 100% and 0%, we express underwriting as a continuous variable rather than all-or-nothing.
P2.
Abnormal returns on announcement are negatively related to the proportion underwritten.
P3.
Abnormal returns on announcement are positively related to k, unless P1 is true but P2
is false (ie underwriting has a positive effect on market reaction).
The theory as presented by EM (1992) and Bøhren et al. (1997) predicts that P1, P2 and P3 are all true.
Supporting evidence has so far been provided by EM using US data and Bøhren et al.
using Norwegian data. EM note that there are substantial commitments to subscribe made before the announcement by existing shareholders in non-underwritten rights issues, but virtually none in underwritten issues, as expected if k affects whether the issue is underwritten (P1). They confirm earlier findings that the average abnormal return is less negative on announcement of rights issues than of firm commitment offers, although there is no difference between the average abnormal return for non-underwritten and underwritten rights. Norway, but they confirm that underwriting increases the direct costs of rights issues.
Subscription pre-commitments are rarely reported, so they measure k as one minus the proportion of rights sold during the offer period. They construct a model to predict k and find that whether an offer is underwritten is negatively related to their proxy for k, as P1 predicts.
They also find that the average abnormal return on announcement is positive for nonunderwritten issues and marginally negative for underwritten issues, which is consistent with P2 .
(ii) The contractual role of the arranger as underwriter is to buy unsold shares at the offer price, up to the limit of its underwriting commitment. However, it is routine for the underwriting bank in a rights issue or open offer to transfer the underwriting risk and part of its fee to investing institutions on the announcement day (a fact not mentioned by SSL).
When institutions accept the risk by signing an underwriting contract, the shares are said to have been sub-underwritten in a rights issue and placed with clawback or placed conditionally in an open offer (they will already have been placed by verbal agreement). In a rights issue the sub-underwriters are providing a guarantee; they will not receive any shares unless the market price is below the offer price at the end of the offer, in which case rights not already taken up can not be sold on the market. In an open offer the placees are not merely providing a guarantee: they buy all the shares not clawed back by existing shareholders. The subunderwriting or placing contract is between the arranger and the sub-underwriter/placee; the arranger remains liable to the issuer for guaranteeing purchase of shares it has underwritten.
For non-underwritten shares, the arranger is still paid to use its 'reasonable endeavours' to find buyers, but provides no guarantee.
The question of whether shares are placed before or after they are underwritten (if they are underwritten) is important in understanding the role the underwriter. If the shares are placed verbally or contractually before the announcement, as in an open offer or a private placing, potential placees can investigate the issuer, decide whether to invest and how much they wish to buy, and indicate the maximum price they are prepared to pay for the new shares.
The price can then be set with the benefit of this information, and the issue announced. The arranger has very little financial risk in underwriting either a rights issue or an open offer or a private placing, and so has little additional incentive to evaluate the issuer if it underwrites.
The risk in underwriting a rights issue is that the arranger fails to find enough subunderwriters after the announcement, but this risk can be made as small as is seen fit by setting a lower offer price. This does not harm non-subscribers because they can sell the Exchange, both available from Primark Extel. 4 The prospectus is sent to shareholders on the day the issue is announced. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by type of issue for the proportion underwritten and for several other variables which are relevant to the study. 42% of issues are less than 100% underwritten, including 13% which are entirely non-underwritten. 5 In nearly two thirds of issues, the prospectus records that commitments have been received to subscribe for some or all of the shares, and the average proportion pre-committed in these issues is 30%. Precommitments include undertakings by existing shareholders to subscribe for their entitlements and undertakings by parties other than the arranger to buy or underwrite shares to which they are not initially entitled. Shares in a private placing accompanying the rights issue or open offer are also counted as pre-committed; the placees in most cases are new investors.
The above undertakings are usually given by named individual or corporate investors, rather than by investing institutions. There is a case for including all open offer shares as precommitted, on the assumption that placees will have been found and will have given verbal agreements by the announcement day. However, these agreements are not legally binding and prospectuses do not explicitly record them or name the placees, so we do not treat them as pre-commitments. Table 1 whether pre-renounced shares have been placed, they are not counted as pre-committed.
We have restricted pre-commitments to undertakings to buy which are clearly stated in the prospectus. It is not always certain that the undertaking is legally binding, and reporting practice regarding pre-commitments may not be entirely consistent across prospectuses. But statements regarding pre-commitments and pre-renunciations are normally treated as important information and can be expected to be accurate. They are given prominence in the Chairman's letter which introduces the prospectus, as well as being recorded under 'Additional Information' at the back. The MMC (1999) report on underwriting services contains no criticism of the scope or reliability of information in prospectuses. Table 1 shows, in addition, average and median discounts to the market price before the announcement, and to the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP). The TERP is defined as
, where P B is the mid-point share price at the close of the day before the announcement, P O is the offer price, S is the number of existing shares and N is the number of new shares offered pro rata to existing shareholders. 6 If there is a dividend to which the existing shares are entitled but not the new shares, the after tax dividend per share is subtracted from the value of the market price in calculating the discount. Issues at a premium of more than 5% to the market price are excluded from analysis involving discounts.
Most are associated with a capital reorganisation which means that the premium is illusory.
The average discount to the market price in rights issues is 21.0% (median 17.6%) compared with an average of 13.0% (7.8%) in open offers. Results are reported using discount to market price (discount), but throughout the paper the results are similar using discount to TERP (the correlation between the two measures is 0.92).
(iii) Proxies for k EM (1992) and Bøhren et al. (1997) is an accurate measure of k ex post. We exclude offers in which the share price is below the offer price at offer close, because the actual take-up in such offers is likely to be lower than the take-up expected ex ante, and we exclude offers for which we lack a share price at close.
The average take-up or claw-back of open offer shares (offered pro rata to existing shareholders) is 48% for all offers and 54% for those not excluded.
The EM theory assumes that k is exogenous, and so is not affected by the discount. This is reasonable in rights issues; whilst a deeper discount increases the value of the rights, it does not increase the incentive for existing holders to take up their rights because the rights can be sold. A deeper discount in an open offer gives existing holders more incentive to subscribe, which potentially increases k. However, depth of discount does not appear to be the main factor affecting take-up in open offers. The correlations in open offers between discount and the first and second proxies for k are -0.16 and -0.19 respectively: a deeper discount is associated with a smaller take-up by existing holders, despite the larger sacrifice a deeper discount implies for non-subscribers.
(iv) Underwriting as a Guarantee
An alternative view of underwriting is that its main purpose is the obvious one of guaranteeing the proceeds, except to the extent that they are already guaranteed through pre-commitments. This view need not imply that the arranger of an SEO has no certification role at all. Rather, it implies that whether and how much of the issue the arranger underwrites makes little difference to the reliability of its certification, because the arranger's reputation is at stake when it brings an issue to market, whether or not it underwrites, and the financial risk to the arranger from underwriting is small. On this view, the extra cost associated with underwriting reported in several studies is due mostly to the insurance premium for expected loss paid to sub-underwriting institutions or placees, not to an extra fee for certification. 8 The hypothesis that underwriting is primarily a guarantee predicts a negative relation between % underwritten and % pre-committed, and no particular relation between % underwritten and proxies for k: the EM theory predicts a negative relation between % underwritten and proxies for k (P1), and no particular relation between % underwritten and % pre-committed, since the latter includes pre-commitments by a mixture of existing shareholders and new investors.
The contrast between the two views of underwriting is clear when one compares (a) an issue mainly pre-committed with new investors (k close to 0), for example an issue with most of the shares pre-renounced and placed with new investors, with (b) an issue with high expected take-up (k close to 1) and no pre-commitments. If the purpose of underwriting is to certify value and the EM theory is true, the arranger would be expected to underwrite issue (a)
but not issue (b). If the purpose of underwriting is to guarantee receipt of the proceeds, the arranger would be expected not to underwrite issue (a), except for the shares not precommitted, but to underwrite issue (b).
(iv) Results
The correlation coefficients reported in Panel A of Table 2 indicate very clearly that underwriting and pre-commitment are substitutes. The correlation between % underwritten and % pre-committed is -0.77. The correlations between % underwritten and the proxies for k are positive, the opposite of the sign predicted by the EM theory. 9 These positive correlations are because pre-commitment is more by new investors than by existing shareholders: % precommitted is negatively related to k (the correlations with the first and second proxies for k are -0.33 and -0.27 respectively). The finding that underwriting and pre-commitments are substitutes is, of course, consistent with the US evidence in EM (1992) of substantial precommitments by existing shareholders in non-underwritten rights issues. Two other factors which might affect % underwritten are share volatility and discount.
Our measure of share volatility is the standard deviation (std dev) of daily returns on the issuer's shares calculated during an estimation period of 160 days, 80 on either side of a period from five days before the announcement to 20 days after the close of the offer. The expected relation between % underwritten and std dev is uncertain a priori: greater volatility increases the value of underwriting, but investment banks may decline to underwrite issuers with a volatile share price. Discount could affect % underwritten because a deeper discount reduces the need for underwriting to ensure subscription. In SSL's sample, the average discount in non-underwritten rights issues is significantly deeper than in underwritten issues, prompting them to suggest that a deep discount is a substitute for underwriting (p. 167). 
Panel B of

EVENT STUDY EVIDENCE (i) Data and Method
We found share data in Primark Extel's database for 1,226 of the 1,378 offers in the sample. There were two problems with the data, both of which could affect other studies.
First, Extel often retains a daily price for periods during which trading in the share has been suspended by the Stock Exchange. We removed 70 offers announced when the shares were in suspension, since in these cases the price could not change on news of the offer. Extel records the dates when a share is suspended and when trading is resumed. Second, the record of daily prices is not always adjusted for the effect of the share going ex-rights, which occurs after the announcement. This is easiest to explain through an example. Suppose there are 100 shares in issue and the market price the evening before the ex-day is 80p. 100 new shares are being issued at an offer price of 40p. Other things equal, the market price falls to the TERP (60p) on the ex-day, because the share loses a right which is worth 20p. The record of prices before the ex-day is normally multiplied by an adjustment factor, which in this case would be 0.75. The adjusted record would be 60p the day before the ex-date and 60p on the ex-date. With no adjustment, the record would be 80p followed by 60p, so failure to adjust means that returns are biased downwards after the announcement. In view of this, we removed 61 issues for which (i) the unadjusted market price for the day before the ex-day is above the offer price and (ii) Extel's adjustment factor equals one on the ex-date, ie no adjustment is made. Extel records the ex-date and both unadjusted and adjusted prices. We removed a further 87 offers which we were unable to check for suspension and non-adjustment, leaving a total of 1,008 issues in the event study.
We report cumulative abnormal returns calculated by the method used by EM (1992).
For each offer a market model regression is run using daily data and dummy variables to distinguish sub-periods of interest:
where R it = return on share i on day t; R Mt = return on FT-Actuaries All Share Index on day t; D 1t = one for event days -1 to 0, and zero otherwise, day 0 being the announcement day; D 2t
= one for days +1 to C-2, day C being the close of the offer; D 3t = one for days C-1 to C, and D 4t = one for days C+1 to C+20. If a share goes ex-dividend during the event period, the net dividend per share is added to the ex-day price to calculate the return on that day. The combined estimation and event period is from 85 days before the announcement (day 0) to 100 days after the close (day C). The offer close, days C-1 to C, is separated out because trading in rights in a rights issue ceases, at the end of day C-2 (MMC, 1999, p. 246). The coefficient γ i is a measure of the abnormal return for each day of the sub-period concerned.
The cumulative abnormal return is γ i times the number of days in the sub-period. γ i can be averaged across the sample and the test statistic for the significance of the sub-period average γ i is:
where N is the number of offers in the sample and s γi is the standard error of the γ i coefficient for share i. An advantage of this method is that it enables a significance test to be calculated for the offer period AAR (days +1 to C-2), despite the fact that offer periods vary in length.
The results using conventional market model abnormal returns are very similar and are not reported. Table 3 shows AARs by sub-period and type of offer. The announcement and offer period AARs are -2.24% and -2.67% respectively for rights issues, and 1.99% and -0.23% for open offers. The AARs at offer close and during the twenty days post offer are more positive for rights issues than for open offers, but the total AAR from the day before the announcement to 20 days after the offer close is -1.68% for rights issues compared with 3.20% for open offers. The two day announcement AAR for rights issues is slightly higher than the two day AAR of -3.09% reported for rights issues by SSL (2000) .
(ii) Abnormal Returns around Rights Issues and Open Offers
To test the EM theory, we relate announcement ARs to % underwritten and to the two proxies for k, controlling for other factors which affect the reaction to an issue. The theory predicts a negative relation between ARs and % underwritten (P2) and a positive relation between ARs and the proxies for k (P3). Both EM and SSL predict a reaction to underwritten open offers no higher than to underwritten rights issues (P4). Table 5 ).
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The univariate results involving the proxies for k provide little support for the EM theory. For open offers, the high k samples have higher AARs than the low k samples, consistent with P3, but the differences are not significant. For rights issues, the high k sample has a more negative AAR, contrary to P3. We also examine whether the presence of prerenounced shares or of an accompanying private placing affects the market reaction. The
AARs are higher for issues with pre-renounced shares, though not significantly so. 13 The AAR for rights issues accompanied by a private placing is 3.99%, compared with -2.57% for other rights issues, a difference significant at the 5% level. 29 of the 35 private placings concerned are non-underwritten, and the AAR for these is 4.75%, which would be hard to explain according to the SSL view. The AAR for open offers accompanied by a private placing is lower than the AAR for other open offers, but the difference is not significant.
Finally, the AAR for discounts less deep than the median for the relevant offer type is significantly higher than the AAR for discounts deeper than the median.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 around here Table 5 reports a selection of cross-sectional regression results with announcement ARs as the dependent variable. The relation between ARs and % underwritten is not significant for any of the samples, which supports neither the EM view that it is overvalued companies which choose underwriting (P2), nor the SSL view that underwriter certification is sufficiently effective that underwriting is associated with a higher abnormal returns. The coefficient on the first proxy for k, 1 -(% pre-renounced + % privately placed (new)), is negative for all three samples and significant at the 5% level for the full sample and for rights issues, which is contrary to P3. The significant negative coefficient for rights issues is mainly because the coefficient on % privately placed, and on % privately placed (new), is positive and highly significant for rights issues. % privately placed is positive but not significant for open offers. % pre-renounced is positive but not significant for either type of offer. The relation between ARs and the second proxy for k, % take-up + % privately placed (old), has the positive sign predicted by the EM theory but is not significant.
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There is a significant negative relation between ARs and discount for all issues and for the sub-samples of rights issues and open offers (discount is also significant with offer period ARs as the dependent variable). This finding is consistent with SSL though not with several earlier studies of rights issues. Marsh (1977) for the UK, Tsangarakis (1996) for Greece and Bøhren et al (1997) for Norway find no relation between announcement AR and discount, while Bigelli (1998) for Italy and Loderer & Zimmerman (1988) for Switzerland find a positive relation. There is reason to expect a positive relation because, for a given amount raised and assuming unchanged or increased dividend per share, a deeper discount implies a higher dividend yield and larger total dividend post issue, which could be interpreted as a sign that the company is confident about paying more cash to shareholders. Bigelli (1998) presents evidence that the positive relation between market reaction and discount in Italy is due entirely to this effect. However, the variable that Bigelli finds explains the positive relation, div yield, is not significant in our regressions.
A final point from the cross-sectional evidence is that the difference in reaction by type of offer is confirmed. The coefficient on a dummy variable which equals one for a rights issue and zero for an open offer is negative and significant at the 5% level.
(iii) Deep Discount Issues
In view of the negative relation between ARs and discount, and in view of the longstanding puzzle why more companies do not substitute a deep discount for underwriting, we investigate deep discount issues further. Table 6 shows that the abnormal loss in market value of companies choosing a deep discount is nearly 20% on announcement and during the offer, though there is some recovery thereafter. To discover why companies choose a deep discount, we read the Chairman's letter to shareholders in the prospectuses of the 174 deep discount issues. The Chairman's letter runs for several pages, describing the background to the issue and other major events in train. There are a number of standard headings including reasons for the issue, terms of the issue and current trading. It turns out that many letters do not explicitly discuss or even mention the fact that the issue is at a deep discount, 17 but we infer the reason if possible, and the findings are shown in Table 7 . 119 (68%) of the issuers were in serious trouble; either the company could not continue at all without an injection of new equity, or it was making the issue because there was an urgent need for funds due to poor performance. If the discount is referred to in these cases, it is always to say that the offer price is 'fair and reasonable' in the light of the poor performance. A further 22 (13%) of issuers had experienced some difficulty, though it is not certain that this was the reason for the issue or for the deep discount. Five (3%) were raising funds for investment in mining or technology projects, the speculative nature of which is emphasised in the letter. Only nine letters (5%)
state that a reason for the deep discount was to avoid paying for underwriting by the arranger.
There is no apparent reason in 21 (12%) of the letters. The evidence is consistent with submissions by corporate financiers to the MMC (1999, p. 30) that deep discounts are used for 'rescue' issues. Tables 6 and 7 around here Panel B of Table 7 shows announcement and offer period AARs for sub-samples of poorly performing and healthy deep discount issuers. 115 of the deep discounts have usable event study data. The AAR on announcement is -10.3% for the 81% of issues by poor performers compared with -0.4% for the issues by apparently healthy companies, though 76% of the ARs are negative. The offer period AAR is significantly negative for both sub-samples.
The lack of reaction on announcement to deep discounts by healthy issuers implies that the large falls in price for poor performers are due to bad news released when the offer is announced rather than to the deep discount itself. We infer that the negative relation between ARs and discount arises from adjustment of the offer price, and hence of the discount to the pre-announcement market price, in anticipation of a change in price on announcement or during the offer. For example, an issuer will anticipate a fall in price if it thinks that news on recent trading in the prospectus is worse than investors are expecting. Although the market does not react very adversely to a deep discount issue by a healthy company, the fact that most deep discount issues are by companies in trouble may be one of the reasons why healthy companies rarely use a deep discount as a substitute for underwriting (other possible reasons are discussed in MMC, 1999, pp. 29-31 and Marsh, 1994, pp. 34-7) .
(iv) Uncontaminated Results
Most of the offer announcements are 'contaminated' by other news, for example interim results, acquisitions or management changes. Contaminated announcements are presumably accepted in most event studies of SEOs, since no mention is made of removing them. As a check on the effect of contaminating news, Table 8 shows AARs for a 'clean' sample of 124 offers in which the only major event announced is the offer itself. The announcement and offer period results have the same pattern as those in Table 3 ; the contrast is, if anything, greater between the negative returns for rights issues and positive returns for open offers. There is no recovery post-offer in the 'clean' sample for either type of offer. In cross-sectional regressions (not shown), the coefficient on discount ceases to be significant with announcement ARs as the dependent variable but remains significant at the 5% level with offer period ARs. The much reduced significance for discount in the 'clean' sample is consistent with the hypothesis that companies adjust offer prices and discounts for anticipated changes in share price in response to news about to be released. Table 8 around here
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence from UK rights issues and open offers lends little support to the assumption made by Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) that a major benefit of underwriting is certification of issuer value. The EM theory assigns a crucial role to k, the proportion of shares expected to be taken up by existing shareholders, in explaining the proportion underwritten. But it is the proportion of pre-committed shares which determines the proportion underwritten, not proxies for k. Offers are normally underwritten by the arranger except to the extent that binding commitments have been given before the offer is publicly announced. The EM theory predicts that the market reaction to announcements is negatively related to the proportion underwritten and positively related to the take-up by existing shareholders, but our evidence does not bear out these predictions.
SSL examine rights issues and bought deals, and argue that underwriters certify the value of issuers in the UK more reliably than EM assume. They argue that the reliability of certification depends on the financial risk borne by the underwriter. The hierarchy of underwriter risk is, in descending order, bought deal, underwritten rights issue and nonunderwritten rights issue, and they find that the announcement AARs by offer type display the same hierarchy. Our evidence does not support the SSL view of certification, though we do not study bought deals. We find that rights issues less than 50% underwritten have a higher, not lower, AAR than other rights issues. Open offers less than 50% underwritten have a lower
AAR than other open offers, as SSL would expect, but the relation between ARs and the proportion underwritten is not significant after controlling for discount. If the SSL argument were true, the market reaction should not differ between underwritten rights issues and underwritten open offers, because underwriting is no more risky in an open offer than in a rights issue. But the announcement AAR is 2.9% for underwritten open offers and -2.6% for underwritten rights issues. Our sample includes rights issues accompanied by a nonunderwritten private placing. According to the SSL view, the announcement AAR ought to be at least as negative as the AAR for underwritten rights of -2.6%, but in fact it is 4.8%.
Both SSL and the current study find a strong negative relation between the market reaction and discount. SSL contend that a deep discount signals overvaluation: a deep discount in an underwritten issue implies that the share price the underwriter believes to be correct is below the issuer's current market price; a deep discount in a non-underwritten issue is used to substitute for underwriting to ensure subscription, presumably because the arranger has declined to underwrite or because the certification benefit at a deep discount is not worth the extra cost. However, we find that deep discounts are rarely used on their own as a substitute for underwriting. All but 16 of the 174 issues at a deep discount (30% or deeper to the market price) are at least 50% pre-committed or underwritten. The prospectuses of deep discount issues indicate that four fifths of the issuers were in difficulty at the time of the offer, and there is little reaction on announcement to the minority of deep discount issues by healthy companies. So the large falls in price post-announcement appear to be due mainly to bad news released when the offer is announced, not to the deep discount itself. Thus, the price falls are neither because of the absence of underwriter certification (in a non-underwritten offer), nor because the discount is viewed as a signal that the certified value is less than preannouncement market value (in an underwritten offer). We suggest that most deep discounts to pre-announcement prices are set deep in anticipation of release of bad news, and perhaps to help obtain pre-commitments. The fact that most deep discount issues are by companies in difficulty may be one reason why very few healthy companies use a deep discount as a substitute for underwriting.
Our findings suggest that the purpose of underwriting in UK rights issues and open offers is primarily to guarantee the amount underwritten rather than to certify that the issuer is not overvalued. The analysis of the proportion underwritten indicates that underwriting is used as a substitute for pre-commitment to achieve certainty of proceeds for the issuer. The analysis of abnormal returns provides little support for predictions resulting from an assumption that underwriters certify, either with uniform unreliability or with reliability dependent on the type of offer. Thus, underwriter certification is not, in our view, the explanation for the positive reaction to open offers (or to private placings). A more plausible explanation is that there is certification by investors, and that it is the placees' willingness to buy at the offer price that informs the market about the issuer's value, rather than the arranger's willingness to underwrite at the offer price. There may be other explanations. 
3.
The author was told in interviews that it is rare for an institution to renege on a verbal placing agreement. Once the institution has signed a placing (or sub-underwriting) contract the only risk to the underwriting bank is that the institution defaults.
4.
Extel provides scanned copies of prospectuses from 1 July 1991 onwards, and aims to include all issues by listed companies. Extel keeps some prospectuses on microfiche for issues before 1 July 1991, though its collection is incomplete. We include all issues from 1 January 1985 to 30 September 1996 for which Extel has a prospectus. Issues by foreign companies and by investment trusts (closed end investment funds) are excluded. shares are often underwritten, but they are not being sold by the issuer, so it seems best to exclude them. We also exclude shares placed on behalf of existing shareholders (secondary placings).
6.
The difference between the market price and the TERP is the expected value of the right or part-right attached to each existing share. N excludes shares in an accompanying private placing, to which existing shares carry no entitlement.
7.
The broker usually reports the number of shares taken up, as well as the percentage taken up, from which one can infer that the percentage take-up is often an overstatement of the take-up by existing holders because the broker has excluded pre-renounced shares from the total of shares 'available in the offer' on announcement day. If an offer has pre-renounced shares and the take-up is reported as a percentage only, we record no figure for take-up as it is uncertain whether the percentage is of all the shares in the open offer or of shares not prerenounced.
8. Armitage (2000) finds that direct costs of issue in the UK increase with the proportion underwritten, but that the costs are not related to factors likely to affect certification costs such as specific risk of the issuer's shares. However, there is some evidence that US underwriter remuneration is related to proxies for certification costs (Armitage, 1998, pp. 44-7) .
9.
The same results are found using 2x2 tables in which both variables take a value of either one or zero, and significance is tested by χ 2 . % underwritten equals one if the issue is at least 50% underwritten; % pre-committed equals one if there are any pre-commitments; the first proxy for k equals one if % pre-renounced + % privately placed (new) = 0; the second proxy for k equals one if % take-up + % privately placed (old) ≥ 50%.
10.
The results are similar when the regressions are run as logit regressions, with % underwritten equal to one if the issue is 50% or more underwritten and zero otherwise.
11.
Underwriting fee rates are not related to issuer risk, which makes underwriting riskier issues less attractive (Armitage, 2000) . However, discounts affect the risk of underwriting, and they vary considerably.
12.
To the extent that an issue for cash is used to finance the acquisition of another company, the Takeover Panel requires the issue to be underwritten to ensure the company has the necessary funds (MMC, 1999, p. 54) . 49% of the issues in our sample are partly or wholly to finance an acquisition.
13.
The negative AAR for the 62 open offers less than 50% underwritten is due to 11 which are deeply discounted and have an AAR of -19.6%. Section 4(iii) suggests that the negative reaction to deep discounts is due primarily to the release of bad news on announcement, not to lack of underwriter certification.
14. SSL report a significantly more negative AAR for 20 underwritten rights issues with pre-renounced shares than for 180 underwritten rights issues without pre-renounced shares.
We do not obtain this in our sample of 421 fully underwritten rights with event study data, 94
of which have pre-renounced shares.
15. SSL report a significantly positive relation between announcement ARs and the percentage take-up reported by brokers at the end of rights issues, and note that this is consistent with the EM theory. We obtain this finding but doubt its value as evidence for the 18. There remains the question why there is no negative relation between ARs and discounts in markets other than the UK. The determination of the very variable discounts in those markets has been little studied. Also, the lack of relation between ARs and discounts in the UK before the mid-1980s (Marsh, 1977; SSL, 2000) warrants further investigation. included. Shares underwritten = underwritten by arranger; pre-committed = commitments to subscribe have been received before announcement (= sold to shareholders + sold to others + privately placed); sold to shareholders = offered pro rata to existing shareholders and they have undertaken to buy; sold to others = offered pro rata to existing shareholders and others have undertaken to buy; privately placed = not offered pro rata to existing shareholders; prerenounced = offered pro rata to existing shareholders and renounced before announcement; discount to market price (discount) = (market price at close of day before announcement less net dividend per share to which new shares are not entitled, if applicable, less offer price)/(market price less net DPS to which new shares are not entitled); discount to TERP = as for discount, but using theoretical ex-rights price instead of market price. Issues at a premium of 5% or more to the market price are excluded from the samples for discount.
Sample numbers vary due to missing data. Source: own calculations for all variables, from information in prospectuses and company announcements, from Primark Extel. 
